ABSTRACT Without interfering wireless networks, passive spectrum monitoring is important for network diagnosis and radio frequency management in spectrum-sharing wireless networks. Most of the related works focused on the sniffer-channel assignment problem, i.e., assigning each wireless sniffer a proper operating channel, with the aim of tracking the target signals or data packets. These approaches were usually designed for the scenarios, where the behaviors of malicious or suspect wireless users are known. In this paper, we focus on the problem of spectrum patrolling in a cognitive radio network, in which the sniffers have no specific targets, but try to patrol the spectrum of interest over a temporal-spatial region. Once the periodicity or regularity of the wireless traffics is identified, a patrol path will be developed for routine patrolling. The path planning problem is formulated as a robust reward maximization problem with uncertain channel information. We propose both optimal and sub-optimal algorithms to determine the route of spectrum patrolling and validate it through numerical simulations. Simulation results show that our proposed algorithm can achieve the maximal reward even with unknown information of the users' activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio is a promising paradigm to resolve the dilemma between the growing wireless applications and the limited number of licensed spectrum resources. By exploiting the spectrum in an opportunistic fashion, cognitive radio allows the unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to utilize the licensed spectrum bands (such as the spectrum of cellular system and TV bands) without introducing excessive interference to the licensed primary users (PUs) [1] . Nevertheless, the flexible spectrum utilization in CRNs also brings an increasing risk of spectrum infringement from malicious cognitive users. As a result, the key to success depends on the high-quality spectrum monitoring in CRNs.
For the purposes of network forensics, passive traffic monitoring is proposed to collect detailed PHY/MAC-layer information in wireless networks by spatially deploying a set of wireless sniffers [2] , which are dedicated hardware devices that can intercept and log packets in their vicinity. Our target in this paper is to design the strategy for deploying a set of sniffers to meet certain performance requirement. Due to hardware constraint and limited sensitivity, it may not be feasible for a limited number of sniffers to monitor wireless traffic continuously and seamlessly, which promotes the sniffer deployment problem in multi-channel wireless networks (e.g., cellular system and WLAN) to maximize the spatial coverage being monitored by a finite number of sniffers, e.g., [3] , [4] . Besides, each sniffer is usually a lowcost and low-power sensor device with limited capability. It may erroneously detect or miss a data packet given the fixed sensing period. All these issues motivate us to solve the sniffer-channel assignment (SCA) problem by maximizing the expected number of data packets captured accurately, which can be achieved by developing an optimal strategy to allocate each sniffer an appropriate operating channel.
The SCA problem has been studied extensively in the literature, e.g., [5] - [10] . The sniffer monitoring framework was firstly introduced in [2] . Based on this framework, the existing research works mainly focused on sniffers' spatial coverage (e.g., [5] , [11] ) and sniffer-channel assignment (e.g., [12] , [13] ). A variety of algorithms based on optimization theory [5] or machine learning policies [9] were proposed to achieve optimal quality of monitoring (QoM), which is defined as the expected number of active wireless users under monitoring. However, most of the existing works considered ideal channel conditions and error-free sensing result, i.e., each sniffer will capture the data packet accurately as long as it appears in the sniffer's operating channel. These assumptions hardly hold in practice as a variety of factors may compromise the reliability or accuracy in channel monitoring, such as packet loss due to channel fading, miss detection due to the sniffer's functional failure, and periodically scheduled sleep for energy saving. Moreover, the wireless users' activities in the monitoring region are usually assumed to be time invariant, which implies that the activity pattern of the malicious or suspect users are known. However, such assumptions hardly hold in practice. To account for such unreliable monitoring conditions, we have introduced the concept of capture probability in our previous work [14] to characterize the unreliability of passive monitoring in practice. It is defined as the probability of successfully capturing a data packet on the sniffer's operating channel. Thus, the QoM relates to not only the packet occurrence probabilities on different channels but also the sniffers' capture probabilities. To reflect the stochastic nature of wireless channels, we assume the packet capture probability of each sniffer vary on different channels. Therefore, by adopting the notion of capture uncertainty, a more practical formulation of the problem could be drawn.
In this paper, we consider a more practical scenario of spectrum monitoring, namely, spectrum patrolling, in which the sniffers have no pre-determined targets, but patrol the targeted spectrum bands over a temporal-spatial region to detect unauthorized devices accessing the spectrum. The information of user activities are usually available from the third-party measurement system, such as spectrum sensing system [15] and mobile crowdsourcing [16] . Thus, it becomes feasible to measure and estimate the characteristics of wireless traffic in a specified area. Once the periodicity or regularity of wireless traffic is identified, a patrol path will be deployed as the routine patrolling. The optimal patrolling problem has been investigated for mobile robot and traffic management, e.g., [17] - [19] . By modeling the interested temporal, spatial and spectral areas in the similar way, we can formulate the optimal patrolling problem for spectrum monitoring.
One main challenge differentiating our work from robot patrolling is the inherent uncertainty due to the stochastic nature of wireless channels. A growing effort has been devoted to model the channel uncertainty in terms of power gain or traffic measurement. The complicated monitoring environment requires the integration of a complementary set of techniques to improve robustness and the adaptive control mechanisms to match the dynamics of spectrum environment. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study spectrum patrolling with uncertain channel conditions.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) we investigated the spectrum patrolling problem in cognitive radio networks to find the optimal sniffer patrolling path, considering time-varying user activities and physical restrictions on sniffer.
2) the uncertainties of channel conditions are fully considered in this paper. The concept of capture probability is adopted to reflect the stochastic nature of wireless channel and develop a more practical problem formulation. 3) the path planning problem is formulated as a robust reward maximization problem, which maximizes the data capture reward with uncertain channel information. An optimal sniffer patrolling algorithm was proposed to determine the sniffer deployment strategy. 4) simulation results show that our proposed algorithm can achieve the maximal reward while eliminating the effect of uncertainty information of user activities. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the system model in Section II and the problem formulation with complete information in Section III. Robust counterparts have been given and solved in Section IV. Section V shows the simulation results, followed by conclusions in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-channel cognitive radio network with N channels, denoted by the set N {1, 2, . . . , N }, and multiple primary users scheduled to transmit in a time-slotted structure. The operating channel of each user is determined by some channel assignment algorithm [20] . If multiple users are assigned to the same channel, only one user will be chosen to transmit at one time. The traffic loads in each channel may vary over time. Independent of the cognitive radio network, there exists a wireless monitoring system with the objective to identify unauthorized user activities and data packets as many as possible.
A. BUDGET CONSTRAINED SNIFFER DEPLOYMENT
The monitoring system consists of a central coordinator and S sniffers, denoted by the set S {1, 2, . . . , S}. Generally, we have S < N due to a limited budget. Due to the hardware limitation of the sniffers, each sniffer can be only deployed in a pre-determined location (or station) to measure wireless traffic over a single channel at a specific time unit. Once it is assigned to a channel, it will stay on that channel and monitor the data packets for at least one time slot. It also means that a sniffer can only observe wireless traffic over a single channel at a time. Given the sniffer's operating channel, it constantly monitors the channel and reports observations to the coordinator via a dedicated feedback channel. In the context of spectrum patrolling, each sniffer can switch between different channels or change the monitoring area to trace abnormal traffic. A system model is shown in Fig. 1 . The trace of a sniffer switching its operating channel is defined as the route of spectrum patrolling:
Definition 1 (Route of Spectrum Patrolling): The route is constructed by a set of the channel selections of a wireless sniffer following the chronological order.
We divide the whole time period of spectrum patrolling (such as a day or a week) into T time slots according to the stochastic properties of traffic variations. We assume that the traffic measurement in each time slot is relatively stable and can be obtained from the channel measurement. We denote the set of admissible sniffer deployment scheme over T time slots as follows:
where T = {1, 2, . . . , T } denotes the set of decision epoch over T time slots. Each entry p n,t in the N × T deployment matrix P = {p n,t } n∈N ,t∈T will be assigned to 1 if one sniffer is assigned to monitor channel n in time slot t. Otherwise we set p n,t = 0. The budget constraint on sniffer deployment in each time slot t ∈ T can be simply represented as follows:
Note that it is possible that multiple sniffers are deployed on the same channel in a time slot. In this case, we assume that the set of sniffers constitutes a sniffer group and each member in this group is viewed as a sub-sniffer with the same monitoring task. The information fusion is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a batch of related work on information fusion has been published and can referred to for detail, e.g. [21] , [22] . Therefore, for simplicity, the traffic information measured by the sniffer group is simply the sum of the traffic information collected by all sub-sniffers, i.e., more sniffers deployed on the same channel, more information will be available.
The traffic load over T time slots on all channels is defined as the traffic matrix R, in which each entry r n,t for n ∈ N and t ∈ T represents the traffic measurement information on channel n and in time slot t. We define the payoff in time slot t of the spectrum monitoring system as simply the total traffic on all channels under the sniffers' monitoring: (2) bears the physical meaning that we are aiming to deploy a limited set of wireless sniffers to the most congested channels, monitoring the main stream of wireless traffic on different channels of the cognitive radio network. This is reasonable as the malicious users or attackers are mostly like to cause severe network failure by injecting extra traffic to the most congested channels. Whereas, on less congested channels, the channel access of unauthorized users will cause less significant performance degradation to the licensed spectrum users.
B. COST-SENSITIVE SPECTRUM PATROLLING
The wireless sniffers are usually sensor devices, having limited energy supply or simple circuit implementation to reduce maintenance cost. The change of sniffers' operating channels requires the tuning of load impedance at the sniffers' antenna front-end. This will incur extra energy consumption or monitoring delay at the sniffers. For simplicity, we assume that the cost is known and fixed for any change of the sniffers' operating channel. Let C N ×N denote the cost matrix, in which each entry c i,j indicates the cost when a sniffer switches from channel i to another channel j. Let matrix A t denote the sniffers' patrolling strategy at time slot t. Each element a i,j,t of the matrix A t is a binary decision variable. Once a sniffer relocates from channel i to channel j in time unit t, we assign a i,j,t to 1, otherwise 0. Hence, the route of spectrum patrolling is the set of patrolling strategies A t for t ∈ T . Note that the cost in the first time slot is fixed and we can simply set a i,j,1 = 0 for i, j ∈ N and i = j. The total cost of the sniffers by taking the patrolling strategy A t in time slot t is given by:
and the total cost over the whole spectrum patrolling period is simply given by c = t∈T c t (A t ). Till this point, we can define the utility of a spectrum patrolling strategy as the difference between the payoff achieved by monitoring different channels and the total cost incurred by channel switching, which is a function of the sniffers' deployment and patrolling strategies as follows:
where A = {A t } t∈T specifies the routes of spectrum patrolling for individual sniffers. Note that the sniffer deployment strategy P = [p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T ] over T time slots are closely coupled with the patrolling strategy A. Given the initial deployment strategy p 1 , the deployments of sniffers p t in the following time slots are actually determined by individual sniffers' channel switching decisions specified by A.
To simplify the system modeling and break the ties between successive time slots, we also introduce P as the decision variable, while its dependence on the spectrum patrolling decision A is determined by the physical constraints as follows:
The first inequality indicates that the sniffer operating on channel n can patrol to any other channel in the next time slot (t + 1), while the second inequality represents the fact that in the t-th time slot, the sniffer deployed in channel n may be relocated from any channel in the (t − 1)-th time slot. When multiple sniffers are deployed on the same channel, the constraint (3) denotes the fact that the sub-sniffers operating on channel n may migrate from any other channel and may also relocate to any other channel in next time slot. Given the whole decision period T , we define the feasible set of (A, P) as follows: (1) and (3)}.
Note that relies on the known traffic information on each channel and the fixed cost matrix of channel switching. It is a set-valued function depending on a set of decision epochs.
III. SNIFFER PATROLLING WITH COMPLETE TRAFFIC INFORMATION
We aim to maximize the total utility accumulated over the whole patrolling horizon, by optimizing the sniffers' deployment strategy P and the routes of patrolling A. Hence, we formulate the optimal sniffer patrolling problem as follows:
It is obvious that problem (4) is a non-linear integer program and NP hard, due to the binary matrices P and A. To approximate this problem, we transform it into a linear program by relaxing p n,t ∈ {0, 1} and a i,n,t ∈ {0, 1} to continuous variables, i.e., p n,t ∈ [0, 1] and a i,n,t ∈ [0, 1].
∀ m, n ∈ N and t ∈ T .
By this convention, all constraints in the feasible set (T ) can be rewritten into linear inequalities with respect to the decision variables P and A. Hence, the relaxed problem (5) can be efficiently solved by the existing optimization toolbox, which gives an upper bound on the original problem (4). Moreover, we have the following result verifying the equivalence between (4) and (5). Proposition 1: The optimal solution (p n,t , a m,n,t ) to problem (5) is binary for all t ∈ T and n ∈ N . Therefore, problem (4) and problem (5) are equivalent.
Here we provide a useful insight to complete the proof by contradiction. To proceed, we first define the revenue Q k of a patrolling route k as the reward that a sniffer can collect by operating on all the channels of the route minus the cost caused by channel switching. Considering the special case when S = 1, we first assume neither p * n,t or a * m,n,t is binary, which means that there exits more than one possible patrolling route for these sniffers. In this situation, the physical significance of p * n,t and a * m,n,t changes. Specifically, p * n,t can be viewed as the probability of a sniffer operating on channel n in the t-th time slot, and a * m,n,t denotes the probability of a sniffer relocating from channel m to channel n in the t-th time slot. Therefore, based on the non-binary value of p * n,t and a * m,n,t , K (K > 1) possible patrolling routes can be constructed, while the probability ξ k of selecting each route k and revenue Q k earned by each route can be calculated, k ∈ K = {1, . . . , K }. Besides, the sum revenue collected by all these routes can be given by
, only route k * is selected, the maximal value of Q can be achieved, which contradicts with the condition K > 1. Thus both p * n,t and a * m,n,t should be binary. The result can be easily extended to the case when S > 1, which is omitted here.
The main challenge of problem (4) lies in that it requires the traffic information on all channels over the whole spectrum patrolling period. Such information is usually difficult to obtain in practice as it may require a large number of wireless sniffers to measure the traffic over multiple channels. The collection of traffic information over multiple time slots and channels also takes too much storage space. Moreover, the traffic information in the future time slots beyond the current decision epoch is also impossible for online optimization. Such non-casual information implies that it is problematic for the algorithmic implementation of problem (5) in practice. Nevertheless, the optimal solution to (5) can serve as an offline benchmark for heuristic design of online algorithms.
In the sequel, assuming information causality in decision making at each time slot t, we focus on the online algorithm design to approximate the solution of problem (5) . This requires that, at each time slot, the real-time decision on sniffers' deployment and patrolling strategy (P, A) only depends on past traffic measurements available to the sniffer controller, which are collected over the time slots in the set H t {1, 2, . . . , t}. The online algorithm design usually falls into the Markov decision framework. However, in our problem, the utility function u t (P, A) g t (p t ) − c t (A t ) in each decision epoch not only relates to the current state, which refers to the traffic measurements r t on all the channels, but also depends on the state transitions. It is obvious that the cost function c t (A t ) relates to both current and previous states, which complicates the decision making process in a nonMarkov framework. To bypass such difficulty, we design a heuristic algorithm that is based on the estimation of traffic measurements in the future time slots. The estimated traffic information is then viewed as a prior and leveraged in the optimization. The flow chart of the heuristic algorithm design is illustrated in Fig. 2 . It contains two main steps as follows: VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. Flow chart of the heuristic sniffer patrolling algorithm.
1) FORWARD TRAFFIC ESTIMATION
The traffic measurement r n,t on each channel can be different in successive time slots due to the change of user activities. For each channel n ∈ N , the state transition from r n,t to r n,t+1 can be simply modeled as a Markov process. The transition probability can be estimated by historical measurements in H t and updated accordingly when more channel measurements are available.
Given the state transition probabilities, we can estimate the traffic measurements in a few time slots, say t f time slots in the future. Note that t f can be properly tuned to ensure a desired accuracy in traffic estimation. As shown in Fig. 2 , the forward traffic estimation module provides traffic information for problem (4) . Based on the known traffic information in the current time slot t and the future time slot τ ∈ T t {t + 1, t + 2, . . . , t + t f }, we can find the short-term deployment and patrolling strategies (p t , A t ) for the current time slot t, by solving the myopic utility maximization problem as follows:
Here, the feasible set (T t ) is a truncated version of (T ). The difficulty of traffic estimation lies in that, due to the random variation in the traffic measurement, the value of r n,t is continuous and thus we could have an infinite number of states. One practical solution is to discretize the range of traffic measurement into a finite set, i.e., {r 1 n,t ,r 2 n,t , . . . ,r q n,t }. Then we project the estimated traffic measurement r n,t onto a specific state. In particular, the measurement r n,t falls in the state-k if r n,t ∈ (r k−1 n,t ,r k n,t ), for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q}. This method is simple to implement, but the choice of discretization level q is critical to the performance. Larger q means a smaller grid size and thus more training data is required to ensure a convergent estimation of state transition matrix. On the other hand, a small q implies potentially large errors in the estimation of traffic measurements for the future time slots in T t . The choice of q can be set empirically based on the historical channel measurements.
2) BACKWARD DECISION UPDATE
Based on traffic estimations in T t , the myopic utility maximization (6) finds the sniffers' best strategy (p f t , A f t ) for the current time slot t. Note that the solution to (6) assumes that the sniffers' past decisions in H t are fixed and optimized. Hence, the set of solutions to (6) for subsequent t ∈ T may result in a propagation of errors in the sniffers' route of spectrum patrolling. To tackle this problem, we further design a correction procedure, namely, the backward decision update, to avoid excessive deviation away from the optimal route. As shown in Fig. 2 , the backward decision update module optimizes sniffers' strategy (p b t , A b t ) for the current decision epoch, based on the traffic measurement history in H t . To proceed, the path correction module needs to select the best strategy from either (p
. This can be simply implemented by comparing the utility functions when taking different strategies. Another method is to choose from these two strategies in a probabilistic manner. In particular, the path correction module returns the strategy (p f t , A f t ) with probability (w.p.)
, where u t (·) denotes the utility gained at time slot t. Note that the backward decision update module generates the patrolling strategy based on past observations, while the forward traffic estimation module helps produce a myopic decision based on future traffic estimations. Therefore, the path correction module actually finds a balance between the value of the information in the past and the future. We list the solution procedures in Algorithm 1. Update t ← t + 1 and goes to step 2)
Algorithm 1 Myopic Sniffer

IV. ROBUST SNIFFER PATROLLING WITH INCOMPLETE TRAFFIC INFORMATION
Due to the stochastic nature of wireless channels, the traffic measurement r n,t on each channel may randomly fluctuate. Knowing that exact traffic information is inevitable, the development of a quantitative uncertainty model can help design proactive patrolling strategies for the sniffers to avoid sharp performance deterioration. In this part, we aim to design the optimal patrolling strategy that is robust against the randomness in the measurements of traffic matrix R.
There are generally three different types of uncertainty models. The stochastic model is the most straightforward one that assumes that the random traffic measurement follows a specific distribution, e.g., Gaussian distribution. Though it is easy to handle in a closed-form solution, it is quite a strong assumption in practice. The worst-case robust model stipulates that the error estimate of traffic measurement r n,t lies in a compact convex set, leading to a max-min problem that can be tackled by convex reformulation or approximation, e.g., semidefinite relaxation. The distributional robust model assumes available partial information about the random channel estimate, such as the first-order and secondorder moments of the random channel [23] . In the sequel, we extend the last two uncertainty models to the sniffer patrolling problem and employ them to reformulate the robust counterpart of (4).
A. ROBUST PATROLLING STRATEGY IN THE WORST-CASE MODEL
The worst-case robust model assumes that the traffic measurement is confined in a convex set. In particular, due to measurement errors, the traffic measurements in each time slot t can be written as r t = r + , where r is the nominal estimate and denotes the error estimate. We assume that the norm of is upper bounded by δ t , which allows us to define the uncertainty set of r t as follows:
Here δ t can be viewed as the size of uncertainty set U t (δ t ). A larger δ t implies that r t fluctuates more intensively and generally we have U t (δ
t . Without loss of generality, we can assume δ = δ t for t ∈ T .
To this point, we can revise the original problem to bring robustness against the uncertainty in R as follows:
The max-min problem (8) ensures the worst-case optimal patrolling strategy, which provides the best utility when the random traffic measurements are subject to the worst-case fluctuations. By introducing an auxiliary variable, we can transform (8) into a constrained maximization problem as follows:
The constraint (9b) ensures that the worst-case payoff in the t-th time slot is always upper bounded by (r t + ) T p t for any realization of the error estimate in the convex set defined by { :
It is obvious that (9b) defines a semi-infinite constraint, which makes problem (9) difficult to process directly. In the sequel, we propose a convex reformulation of (9b).
1) CONVEX REFORMULATION BY S-LEMMA
Note that (9b) is quadratic in terms of the error estimate . By applying S-lemma [24] , it can be fairly transformed into convex form, which leads to the robust counterpart of (4) with the worst-case robust model:
Similarly, by replacing p n,t ∈ {0, 1}, a i,n,t ∈ {0, 1} with (5b), the upper bound of problem (10) can be derived by:
Different from problem (4) and its equivalence (5), the worst-case convex reformulation (11) is not necessarily equivalent to (10) due to the measurement errors. Hence, in the sequel, we aim to design a branch and bound algorithm to determine the robust solution to problem (10) . Note that all constraints in problem (11) are linear inequalities with respect to p t and A t . It is obvious that (11) is convex and increasing in a m,n,t and p t by checking the first-order and second-derivatives. Therefore, the optimal solutionp t andÂ t of problem (11) can be obtained by solving an semi-definite program (SDP) efficiently with the existing optimization toolbox, e.g., SeDuMi or CVX [25] . On the other hand, a lower bound of problem (10) can be easily achieved by solving an SDP with any feasible sniffer deployment strategy p t .
2) ROBUST SNIFFER PATROLLING ALGORITHM
The basic idea of the proposed algorithm is to binarize the solution (p t , A t ) matrix row by row. The process will last until p t andÂ t are all binary, then the optimal sniffer deployment and switching strategies are determined by p t =p and A t =Â t , respectively. If the binary solution is not available, by checking the value of a m,n,t , we can know how the sniffer group allocates its sub-sniffers. If a m,n,t > 0, we conclude that a part of the sub-sniffers on channel n are relocated to channel m in the t-th time slot. Defining U n,t ∈ U t as the set of sub-sniffers deployed on channel n in the t-th time slot. Initially, we set U n,t = ∅ and then we update it by U n,t = U n,t ∪ {m} if a n,m,t > 0. Therefore, in the t-th time slot, for all elements in each non-empty set U n,t , the algorithm divides the feasible region of (p k,t ,p U n,t /k,t ,p −n,t ) into several subspaces, i.e., D n,
for notational convenience. After that, the algorithm continues to evaluate an upper bound on a division D ∈ D {D n,k,t }. If the upper bound on the division D is less than the current lower bound of (10), it will be removed from set D and no further division on D is required. Once there is only one element included in U n,t for any n ∈ N , allp n,t becomes binary and the procedure turns into the next time slot.
Till this point, we have proposed the solution method to obtain the upper bound of problem (10) . The exact evaluation of the upper bounds ensures the convergence of the robust sniffer patrolling algorithm by successively improving the lower bound and trimming undesired branches. In the initialization stage, a lower bound of (10), denoted as , is obtained by solving problem (10) with the fixed channel assignment and switching strategy, which is achieved by solving (4) based on the nominal traffic estimate. The initial upper bound, denoted as , is obtained by solving problem (11) directly. The detailed solution procedures are listed in Algorithm 2. If we evaluate problem (11) with the fixed binary channel assignment scheme p t , the patrolling strategy A t will also be binary. Update (P , A ) according to the solution 8: if the optimum > and D is binary 9: Update by the newest low bound 10: end if 11: Update t by finding the first non-binary row of P
Algorithm 2
12:
Update U t and divide D into several sub-division D i
13:
i ← the optimum of (10) Compared to the worst-case robust model, the distributional robust model assumes extra distributional information about the random channel estimate, such as the first-order and second-order moments of the random channel. In the traffic measurements, although the accurate distribution of r t is not easy to obtain, we can easily measure its mean statistic, denoted by u t , from a large set of historical data. Similarly, the second-order moment statistic, denoted by v t E[r t r T t ], can also be obtained by historical measurements.
1) DISTRIBUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY WITH MOMENT INFORMATION
To make use of these moment information, we can refine the uncertainty set of r t as follows:
where P t denotes the distribution function of r t and W(u t , v t ) (simply denoted by W t ) represents the set of distributions with the first-order and second-order moments given by (u t , v t ). Here P ∞ is the set of all valid probability distributions. Given the statistical information (u t , v t ) and uncertainty set W t , each sniffer anticipates the fluctuations of the payoff function and optimizes its decision to improve the overall utility over the decision horizon T . When the information (u t , v t ) changes, the sniffers will adapt their deployment strategies accordingly. Due to hardware constraints and delayed responses, it is possible that the sniffers may over-estimate the traffic measurement r t in a time slot and operate on mismatched channels. In this case, we can rewrite the constraint (9b) into a probabilistic form as follows:
where α is defined as the tolerance of payoff outage. Note that the worst-case constraint (9b) requires g t ≤ r T t p t to hold in any case, which is quite a strong requirement. If r t experiences a large variation with little probability, the constraint (9b) will lead to very poor performance. While the probability constraint (13) intentionally remove such outlier and avoids severe performance deterioration by rarely occurring events. To this end, the distributional robust counterpart of the original problem can be formulated as follow:
The semi-infinite probability constraint (13) is still difficult to process directly. In the sequel, we firstly present a general convex approximation for the probability constraint in (13) and then find the convex reformulation for (14) . Lemma 1: The probability constraint (13) can be approximated by a convex constraint as follows:
The proof of Lemma 15 is similar to that in [26] and skipped here for conciseness. The maximization operation ensures that the probabilistic constraint (13) holds for any realization of distribution P t in its uncertainty set W t . According to the definition of W t , the maximization operation in (15) involves the first-order and second-order moment statistics and we have the following proposition to further simplify it.
Proposition 2: Problem (14) admits an equivalence as follows: The proof focuses on the reformulation of worstcase expectation in (15) . To proceed, we rewrite the distributional uncertainty set in (12) as follows:
We require that the set W is non-empty and the equality in (17) holds with some distribution P t interior to the set W.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We implemented the proposed algorithm in Matlab and conduct two sets of numerical simulations to evaluate its performance. In the simulations, there are N channels in the cognitive radio network. The system runtime is divided into T time units. The statistic information of traffic load on all the channels is randomly generated by r n,t ∈ (0, 1). Besides, the cost matrix C is generated corresponds to the spectrum distance between two channels. Specifically, c i,j = γβ|i − j|, where γ denotes the potential error which is assumed to follow the normal distribution, and β is the cost for the unit of channel distance and hence is set to be 0.01 for simplicity. We vary the number of channels N in the range [4, 10] and the number of time units T in the range [3, 5] . The simulation with each setting (N , T ) is repeated for 100 times to even random disturbance. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case when N = 5, T = 3, and S = 2 for the simplicity of illustration.
A. ROBUST UTILITY IN THE WORST-CASE MODEL
Firstly, we evaluate the robust optimal sniffer patrolling under the worst-case model by comparing total achieved reward of our proposed algorithm in different cases. Fig. 3 shows one representative result. Initially, we set δ/||r t || = 0.1, ∀t ∈ T . Next, we enlarge δ 2 , δ 3 , and δ 4 respectively in Case {1, 2, 3} while other δ t is kept unchanged. With this setting, we check how the optimal sniffer deployment scheme and the total utility change with the variations of traffic measurements. Firstly, we notice that the total utility remains unchanged after the channel redeployment point in each case. This result shows that the total utility of the whole network will decrease with respect to the increase of channel uncertainty size, when the error estimates of traffic measurements are not significant enough to trigger channel redeployment. However, as the size of traffic uncertainty on one channel increases, the sniffer will not choose to operate on this channel any more. Hence, the further increase of the uncertainty will not bring down the total utility. Besides, comparing these three cases, we can easily tell that the declining rate of curve in each case is different.
A sharp slope indicates larger traffic on that channel and more time units occupied by the channel. Moreover, larger uncertainty is required in Case 3 to trigger the channel redeployment comparing with the other two cases, which means the optimal channel assignment scheme is robust against the uncertainty of channel 4.
B. ROBUST PERFORMANCE WITH DISTRIBUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY
In this subsection, we consider the distribution uncertainty model of r n,t . We assume that the channel's moment information (u t , v t ) is available. The mean u t of channel reward r t is set to be the nominal channel estimater t , and the secondorder moment is assumed to be v t = u t u T t + λ t I, where I is the identity matrix and λ t is a scaling factor. Initially, we set λ t = 0.001, and the outage probability α = 0.1, ∀t ∈ T . By varying λ 3 and λ 5 respectively in Case {1, 3} and Case {2, 4}, we record the total reward with different outage probability α and indicate the point of channel redeployment in Fig. 4 . Note that higher outage probability implies higher chance for sniffers to achieve a higher reward, therefore the total reward in Case {3, 4} is larger than that of Case {1, 2}. Meanwhile, we can observe that the channel redeployment point is right shifted as α increases. Thus with a large α, the channel with higher channel estimater t is more likely to be selected. On the other hand, a large value of the scaling factor λ t corresponds to worse channel condition. Thus, a lower total reward is acquired.
VI. CONCLUSION
Passive spectrum monitoring is important for network diagnosis and criminal investigation in cognitive radio networks. Most of the existing related work focused on the snifferchannel assignment problem. In this paper, we consider another scenario of spectrum monitoring, that is, spectrum patrolling. Sniffers have no specific targets, but try to patrol the interested temporal, spatial or spectral areas. Once the periodicity or regularity of wireless traffic arrivals is learned, a patrol path could be developed for the routine patrolling. The path planning problem is formulated as a robust reward maximization problem, which maximizes the data capture reward with uncertain channel information. We propose an algorithm to determine the optimal solution and validate it through numerical simulations. Simulation results show that our proposed algorithm can achieve the maximal reward while eliminating the effect of uncertain information of user activities. In the future work, we will extend our solution to the scenarios with unknown knowledge of user activities in monitoring area. WENBO 
